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Notes: The full range of the emotions is not properly treated all at once, because, as with thinking, the objects of emotions determines what philosophers want to say about them. Emotion as a general subject--what sort of thing it is--and the commonest types of emotion, which have no special objects, are properly subjects of the philosophy of mind. But whether there is a special aesthetic feeling is a subject of aesthetics, not philosophy of mind; careful evaluations of love and hate belong to ethics; the love of learning might well belong to methodology; love of one’s own opinion, which influences one’s objectivity, might belong to epistemology; honoring considered just by itself is part of the philosophy of mind, but the virtue of honor (or honorability) is another ethical subject, and perhaps some aspects of honoring might belong to political philosophy. This remains to be discussed and settled.
The passions are similar while the objects of the passions vary.
I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men,- desire, fear, hope, etc.; not the similitude of the objects of the passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped, etc.: for these the constitution individual, and particular education, do so vary and they are so easie to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of mans heart, blotted and confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible onely to him that searcheth hearts.
Hobbes, Lev Intro 3
The passions are best discovered not by speech but by other (mainly bodily) signs.
These forms of speech, I say, are expressions or voluntary significations of our passions: but certain signs they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them have such passions or not. The best signs of passions present are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have.
Hobbes, Lev VI 56
How the different types of passions are conceptually interrelated.
These simple passions called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief have their names for diverse considerations diversified. At first, when they one succeed another, they are diversely called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the alteration or succession itself.
Hobbes, Lev VI 13